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Abstract Recent communication networks are commonly
protected against random failures, i.e. being the results of
forces of nature, human errors, or hardware faults. In simu-
lation experiments, network topologies are often assumed to
be more or less regular. Known mechanisms typically refer
to the case of unicast traffic protection. However, owing to
the observed convergence of technologies/services, the im-
portance of other transmission techniques (e.g. anycast, or
multicast) has been increasing. Moreover, it turns out that
neither failures of network elements are only the results of
random faults, nor topologies of real networks are purely
regular.
In this paper we introduce a novel technique, called RA
(the abbreviation for “resistant-to-attacks”) of protecting the
anycast and unicast flows against attacks on irregular net-
works. In particular, we propose a new metric of link costs
to be used in working path computations with the objective
to avoid traversing the nodes of high degree (i.e. vulnerable
to attacks). The extent of losses after attacks is further de-
creased by locating the anycast replica servers at low-degree
nodes.
The ILP model for joint optimization of anycast and
unicast flows has been formulated and followed by the
time-efficient heuristic algorithm. Path protection scheme
for the case of protection against a single node failure is
assumed. For each anycast demand, working and backup
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replica servers are located at different network nodes (dis-
joint replica model).
Simulation results confirm that our approach provides a
remarkable decrease (up to 7.47 times) in terms of the to-
tal number of connections broken due to attacks, compared
to the results for the common case of locating the replica
servers at high-degree nodes, and utilizing the metric of dis-
tance to find both working and backup paths.
Keywords Reliability · Protection · Anycast · Unicast ·
Optimization
1 Introduction
Failures of communication networks elements are inevitable.
They are caused most frequently by forces of nature (e.g.
hurricanes), or human errors (e.g. cable cuts). Their results
may be severe. For instance, a failure of a wide-area net-
work link offering a number (e.g. 80) of parallel transmis-
sion channels (10–40 Gbps each) implies huge data and rev-
enue losses. As presented in [18], a failure affecting more
than 30 thousand users happens once every two days, while
the time to repair is up to 12 hours.
Therefore, network survivability being the ability to pro-
vide the continuous service in the presence of failures [2, 3,
21] is one of the most important aspects of network design.
According to [12], failures of single links are most proba-
ble. Network nodes may also fail. However, as shown in [6],
in high-speed wide-area networks, nodes are usually more
reliable than links. Multiple failures take place, e.g. if some
links are physically routed together in a duct, and a failure,
being the result of a cut, affects many of them simultane-
ously [17, 20].
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Fig. 1 Most common ways of protecting the working paths
In terms of routing, survivability is commonly assured
by means of additional paths (called backup paths), used
to provide transmission after a failure affecting the primary
(working) paths. In order to guarantee the demanded band-
width after the failure of a link (or a node), backup paths
should not have common links (or transit nodes) with the
working paths being protected, accordingly. Regarding the
scope of protection, we typically choose among path, seg-
ment, or link protection/restoration [21], or other special-
ized solutions, e.g. p-cycles [11], or p-structures [16] (see
Fig. 1).
Backup paths may be installed in advance (protection
scheme), or after a failure (dynamic restoration). The first
approach provides full recovery, but it requires a significant
amount of resources (e.g. link capacity). Under dynamic
restoration, there is no guarantee to find the backup paths
after a failure (e.g. if link channels are not available). How-
ever, in this case, link capacities are utilized more efficiently.
Another important aspect of survivable networks design
is the value of service restoration time depending linearly on
the length of working and backup paths [8].
Recent papers are mainly focused on protecting the net-
works against random failures, i.e. being the result of hard-
ware faults, software defects, or human errors. In this con-
text, “random” means that the frequency of affecting various
network elements (even having different topological charac-
teristics such as node degree values) is nearly the same.
Relatively few papers address the problem of providing
protection against attacks (i.e. malicious activities aimed to
bring out severe losses at a minimum cost). This is an im-
portant issue, since a notable increase of attacks has been
observed over the past few years. Unlike random failures,
attacks typically affect network elements being more impor-
tant than the other ones, e.g. nodes/links of relatively high
degree/capacity. Therefore, they occur especially in net-
works having the irregular network topology (i.e. for which
the degrees of nodes differ much from each other).
It is worth noting that topologies of many recent networks
(e.g. Internet topology shown in Fig. 2) are not regular. As
noticed by Barabási and Albert in [5], this is due to the pref-
erential attachment rule frequently observed in the process
of a network growth. According to this rule, it is more proba-
ble to attach a new node to an existing node n of high rather
than low degree, as given in (1). It implies that nodes be-
ing already highly connected are more likely to obtain new





where deg(n) is the degree of node n defined as the num-
ber of incident links Fig. 3 illustrates an example process
of a network growth. At each step, 4 new nodes are added
to the network according to the preferential attachment rule
(1). This example shows that the irregular topology may be
obtained after adding only several new nodes.
The nodes of the highest degrees (e.g. nodes 2 and 3 in
Fig. 3d), are often referred to as central nodes (or shortly
centers). They are typically connected to other nodes by
high-capacity links, and switch/store large amount of data.
Therefore, they are excellent targets of attacks. What is
more, under shortest path routing aimed at minimizing the
length of the path (often met in practice), many shortest
paths traverse these central nodes. As a result, after attack-
ing any central node, many connections become affected.
Shortest path routing, despite being suitable for regular net-
works, thus seems not to be proper for irregular networks,
especially if protection against malicious activities is con-
sidered.
Previous research on reliable networks was mainly fo-
cused on unicast (i.e. one-to-one) communications. How-
ever, another transmission technique—anycast (i.e. one-to-
one-of-many) has also become important, especially owing
to its utilization in peer-to-peer systems (P2P), DNS ser-
vice, or Content Delivery Networks (CDNs) [7, 13], and
others. In anycast communications, information is replicated
and stored in several replica servers located at different net-
work nodes. A particular replica server may be chosen as
the source/destination node of transmission based on sev-
eral criteria, e.g. location of the client node, delay, or QoS.
Regarding the protection issues, anycast backup path may
lead to the same or a different replica server. The latter case
(shown in Fig. 4) provides additional protection against a
failure of one of the end nodes of transmission (which is not
possible for unicast transmission).
The main novelty of this paper is a new approach to pro-
vide protection of anycast and unicast flows against attacks.
In particular, owing to a special metric used to find working
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Fig. 2 Internet topology
paths (different than the standard metric of distance, which
is applied here in backup path computations only), work-
ing paths omit high-degree nodes (i.e. being vulnerable to
attacks). Backup paths are found as the shortest ones. They
traverse central nodes, but are used only after a failure for a
short time.
Additionally, replica servers are located at low-degree
nodes (i.e. of low probability of breaking due to attacks).
As a result, the proposed approach remarkably reduces the
number of connections broken after attacks (compared to the
typical case of using the distance metric in both working and
backup path computations, as well as locating the replica
servers at high-degree nodes).
The respective ILP formulation to find working and
backup paths is presented and followed by an efficient
heuristic algorithm. It is also worth noting that protection
of anycast flows against attacks has not been addressed in
the literature before.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the related work. General assumptions of the pro-
posed approach together with the ILP model are described
in Sect. 3. An efficient heuristic algorithm is next introduced
in Sect. 4. Section 5 presents the results of simulations per-
formed using CPLEX 11.0 solver [15], as well as the heuris-
tic approach.
2 Related work
In anycast (one-to-one-of-many) communications, informa-
tion is replicated and stored in several replica servers typ-
ically located at different nodes. This is a commonly ac-
cepted technique frequently utilized by caching and replica-
tion systems, including Peer-to-Peer (P2P) systems, overlay
networks, wireless sensor networks, web service, distributed
database systems, etc. An excellent example of anycast com-
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Fig. 3 Example evolution of a network topology based on the prefer-
ential attachment rule
Fig. 4 Example anycast connection (primary and backup replica
servers are located here at different nodes)
munications is the Content Delivery Network (CDN), which
is used to deliver the requested content to end users on
behalf of origin Web servers. In CDNs, the original con-
tent is offloaded from the source server to other servers
located at different nodes. The most popular CDN system
widely used in the Internet by larger web sites is Akamai
[7, 13].
Previous works focus mainly on applications of anycast
transmission in IP networks using connectionless transmis-
sion [4, 13]. Anycasing in connection-oriented networks
is considered less frequently. In [14], a generalized RWA
(Routing and Wavelength Assignment) problem is intro-
duced, where lightpaths can be not only unicast but also
anycast or multicast connections. The objective there is to
establish a given set of connections while minimizing the
number of wavelength channels.
Another interesting approach to provide protection
against failures for anycast and unicast transmission is pre-
sented in [22]. In particular, the authors propose a model
of joint optimization of anycast and unicast flows. Restora-
tion methods are applied there to find the backup paths for
broken connections.
All the works mentioned above refer to the case of pro-
tection against random failures. Regarding the issues of any-
cast flows protection against attacks, there are practically no
techniques available in the literature.
3 Proposed approach
The objective of the paper is to propose the survivable rout-
ing of anycast and unicast demands aimed at reducing the
number of flows affected after attacks. Since the extent of
losses after attacks strongly depends on the topological char-
acteristics of the network (in particular on the distribution of
node degrees), one of the possible ways to decrease it is to
modify the routing (e.g. the metric of link costs) according
to these characteristics.
Communication networks typically grow over time. Con-
trary to beliefs of many people, the initial characteristics of
many networks (i.e. designed in the beginning) are rarely
preserved. For instance, it often turns out that networks are
evolving according to the preferential attachment rule, im-
plying that new nodes are being attached to the already
highly connected ones (see Fig. 3). In particular, the authors
of [5] have shown that the growth of a network, if uncon-
trolled, leads to the power law distribution of node degrees
(P (k) ∼ k−γ , where k is the degree of a node). Such power-
law networks are often referred to as scale-free (SF) net-
works. Examples of SF networks include the Internet (with
γ = 2.22 [23]), or networks shown in Fig. 13.
As stated earlier, power law distribution of node degrees
implies the existence of nodes of extraordinary high degree
(being much greater than the average node degree in the net-
work), that are the main targets of attacks. It is also easy to
notice that the vulnerability of the shortest path routing to at-
tacks strongly depends on the topological characteristics of
the network. Therefore, it changes as the network topology
is evolving over time.
The main proposal of the paper is as follows. In order to
reduce the number of connections broken due to attacks, we
introduce a new metric of link costs to be used in working
path computations to make these paths omit central nodes,
as shown in Fig. 5 for the case of Italian Network [1].1 This
metric is dynamic, i.e. it returns different values of link costs
in respond to the changes in the network topology. Addition-
ally, in order to decrease the number of anycast connections
broken after attacks on network nodes, we propose to locate
the replica servers at low-degree nodes (i.e. of low probabil-
ity of breaking due to attacks).
We consider here a directed network (N,A), where: N
and A denote the sets nodes and directed arcs, accordingly.
Each link is thus modeled by a pair of unidirectional arcs:
ah = (i, j) and ah′ = (j, i).
1Topology of Italian network is neither scale-free, nor regular. How-
ever, its node degree distribution is not uniform, and nodes 6, 11, and
17 may be referred to as central nodes.
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Fig. 5 Example anycast routing according to the proposed approach
Each arc ah ah ∈ A:
– is characterized by its length sh and a pair of costs: ζh and
ξh to be used in working and backup path computations,
respectively,
– offers  unidirectional channels of equal capacity.
In this paper, network flows are modeled as the non-
bifurcated multicommodity flows. Anycast and unicast de-
mands are represented by pairs of unidirectional demands
(in opposite directions).
For the purpose of working path computations, we pro-
pose to use the metric based on the so called betweenness
centrality parameter (BC) defined in [10] and shown in (2),
since it provides us with good estimates on the centrality of








#sp(p, q) is the number of the shortest paths between
nodes p and q of the same minimal length
#spn(p, q) is the number of the shortest paths between
nodes p and q of the same minimal length,
traversing node n
In this paper, the cost ζh of any arc ah used in working
path computations is defined in (3) as the average value of
the normalized betweenness centrality parameter (BC∗) of
nodes ni and nj being incident to the arc ah. Since each
central node has a large value of betweenness centrality pa-
rameter, then the cost of any link incident to a central node
is high as well. Working paths will thus omit such network
elements, which in turn will make them resistant-to-attacks.








In the case of backup path computations, the cost ξh of any
arc ah is defined in 5 as the normalized length of this arc.




where sh is the length of arc ah.
In the remaining part of the paper, we call our approach
the RA (the abbreviation for “resistant-to-attack”) method,
in contrast to the common technique (here referred to as
NA—i.e., “non-resistant-to-attack”) of finding both work-
ing and backup paths as the cheapest ones in terms of path
length (using (5) to find working and backup paths), as well
as locating the replica servers at high-degree nodes.
Path protection scheme with protection against a single
node failure is assumed. It means that for each working path,
there is one backup path (having no common transit nodes
with its working path) found in advance.
In simulations we assume that the capacity fr requested
for each demand dr is equal to the capacity of a single link
channel. The capacity of each link channel is unitary. There-
fore, for each demand dr we have fr = 1.
In the ILP model introduced below, for anycast demands
we use indices r = 1 . . . |DAN |, while unicast demands are
described by indices r = |DAN |+1 . . . |D|, where |D| is the
total number of demands.
Indices
(N,A) directed network; N and A denote the sets of
nodes and directed arcs, accordingly
n(h) index of a node (an arc)
DUN set of unicast demands
DAN set of anycast demands. Two types of anycast
demands may be distinguished: downstream or
upstream. Each anycast demand is defined by
the client node (i.e. the source node for the up-
stream demand and the destination node for the
downstream demand). The respective upstream
and downstream demands having the same client
node are associated
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DUS set of anycast upstream demands (i.e. from the
client node to the replica server)
DDS set of anycast downstream demands (i.e. from the
replica server to the client node)
D set of all demands (D = DUN ∪ DAN)
R set of nodes that host the replica servers
r index of a demand (anycast or unicast)
τ(r) index of anycast demand associated with de-
mand r
sr (tr ) source (destination) node of the r-th demand. For
upstream (downstream) anycast demands, only
the source (destination) node sr (tr ) is given, ac-
cordingly
Variables
xr,h(yr,h) equals 1, if the channel of an arc ah = (i, j) is
allocated for a working (backup) path of the r-th
demand, accordingly; 0 otherwise
zr,n(vr,n) equals 1, if replica node n is selected as a work-
ing (backup) replica of the r-th anycast demand,
accordingly; 0 otherwise
Objective
It is to find working and backup paths transporting the re-
quired flows from sources to destinations protected against
a single node failure by single backup paths and minimizing









where ζh(ξh) is the cost per unit flow of each commodity on
the arc ah of a working (backup) path, accordingly
Constraints














1 if n = sr
−1 if n = tr
0 otherwise
(7)
for each r ∈ DUN and n ∈ N;
ah = (i, n) = arc incident into a node n;
ah = (n, j) = arc incident out of a node n
2In order to provide the respective constraints for backup paths of uni-
cast demands, in (7) xr,h must be replaced by yr,h.














zr,n if n ∈ R
−1 if n = tr
0 otherwise
(8)
for each r ∈ DDS and n ∈ N














1 if n = sr
−zr,n if n ∈ R
0 otherwise
(9)
for each r ∈ DUS and n ∈ N
(d) for working paths of associated anycast upstream and
downstream demands dr and dτ(r) (dr and dτ(r) must
use the same working replica node)5:
zr,n = zτ(r),n (10)
for each r ∈ DDS and n ∈ R
(e) or working paths of anycast demands (each anycast de-




zr,n = 1 (11)
for each r ∈ DAN
(f) on finite arc capacity:
∑
r∈D
(xr,h + yr,h) ≤  (12)
for each h ∈ A
3The respective constraints for backup paths of anycast downstream
demands may be obtained from (8) by replacing xr,h and zr,h by yr,h
and vr,h, accordingly.
4Equations for backup paths of anycast upstream demands are similar
to (9) with xr,h and zr,h replaced by yr,h and vr,h, accordingly.
5Constraints for backup paths of associated anycast upstream and
downstream demands dr and dτ(r) are similar to (10) with zr,n and
zτ(r),n replaced by vr,n and vτ(r),n, accordingly.
6In order to provide the respective backup replica node constraints for
backup paths of anycast demands, in (11) zr,n should be replaced by
vr,n.
Reliable anycast and unicast routing: protection against attacks 895









(xr,h + yr,h) ≤ 1 (14)
for each r ∈ D where n = sr ;n = tr for unicast demand
r ∈ DUN for transit nodes (if both paths consist of at
least two arcs); n = sr ;n ∈ R for upstream anycast de-
mand r ∈ DUS for transit nodes (if both paths consist of
at least two arcs); n = tr ;n ∈ R for downstream anycast
demand r ∈ DDS for transit nodes (if both paths consist
of at least two arcs)
(h) providing nonnegativity of variable values:
xr,h ≥ 0; yr,h ≥ 0; zr,n ≥ 0; vr,n ≥ 0 (15)
for each r ∈ D,h ∈ A and n ∈ N
(i) providing the nodal disjointedness of working and
backup replica nodes for anycast demands:
∑
n∈R
(zr,n + vr,n) ≤ 1 (16)
for each r ∈ DAN
Formulas (6)–(15) define a model of survivable routing
that provides protection of anycast and unicast demands
against a single node failure. Constraint (16) is to provide
additional protection against the working replica node fail-
ure (i.e. to ensure that for each anycast demand, working and
backup replica servers are located at different nodes).
The problem defined by formulas (6)–(16) is NP-com-
plete since even the much the simpler task to find |D| work-
ing paths only (without protection) in a capacity-constrained
network is NP-complete [18]. Therefore, apart from this
model, we introduce in the next section a time-efficient
heuristic algorithm to find the solutions for larger problem
instances.
However, as stated in [19], in the case of multi-cost net-
works (i.e. when for any link, different link costs may be
used to find working and backup paths), e.g. in the issue
considered here, the problem is NP-complete even for a sin-
gle demand. Therefore, any heuristic algorithm is able to
return only the suboptimal results even for the simplest case
of finding the paths for one demand only.
4 Heuristic algorithm
In this section we present our heuristic algorithm to calcu-
late disjoint paths for the scenario of differentiated link costs
(i.e. the case where for each arc ah, the costs ζh and ξh to
be used in working and backup path computations, accord-
ingly, may be different). The algorithm presented in Fig. 6
is an extension to the k-Penalty approach introduced by the
authors in [19], originally designed for the case of protect-
ing the unicast traffic against a simultaneous failure of k − 1
network elements. In this paper, the algorithm is extended
to provide protection for anycast demands (in particular un-
der assumption that working and backup replica servers are
located at different network nodes).
In this paper we analyze the properties of the approach
for the case of a path protection scheme applied to provide
protection against a failure of a single node. Therefore, the
algorithm is used here to find k = 2 node-disjoint paths for
each demand. In particular, it implies that in Fig. 6, the costs
ξ1h and ξ
2
h of network arcs ah (stored in matrices 
1 and 
2,
respectively) are initially assigned the values of ζh and ξh,
accordingly.
Similar to the active path first approach, for each de-
mand the algorithm first finds the working path (using any
algorithm of finding the shortest path, e.g. the Dijkstra’s al-
gorithm [9]). The difference is that, in our algorithm when
finding the backup path, the costs of the respective forbid-
den arcs used by the working path, instead of being set to
infinity (in order to provide the disjointedness of the con-
nection paths), are increased by a certain large value. This
modification is introduced to avoid entering into the trap
problem (i.e., the case when the algorithm fails to find the
next path of a demand, even though the requested number
of disjoint paths exists). In particular, in the considered case
of k = 2 disjoint paths, before finding the next path η2 (i.e.
the backup path), the costs of forbidden arcs ah to be used
in backup path computations are increased by the total cost
of the working path of a demand (Step 4), using the matrix
of backup link costs 
2.
In order to avoid entering into the trap problem, the algo-
rithm thus allows the backup path to temporarily traverse the
forbidden arcs. However, such situation implies a conflict,
and, if occurred, then the respective costs ξ1h , ξ2h of the so
called conflicting arcs are permanently increased in 
1,
2
by the total cost of the recently found path η2 in terms of the
link costs from 
1 and 
2, accordingly. In this case, the ex-
ecution of the algorithm also starts from the beginning (see
Step 6.3 in Fig. 6).
It is worth mentioning that after several possible con-
flicts, the algorithm almost always terminates successfully.
In particular, during experiments, the probability of exceed-
ing the upper bound it_upper on the number of allowed con-
flicts was each time less than 0.034.
The time complexity of the algorithm depends on the al-
gorithm used to find the shortest paths in Step 5. In the case
the Dijkstra’s algorithm [9] is used for this purpose, the com-
plexity of the algorithm is bounded from above by O(|N |2),
896 J. Rak, K. Walkowiak
INPUT
• A demand dr to find the set of k = 2 node-disjoint paths (unicast demand is determined by a pair of nodes (sr , tr ), while anycast demand by a
given client node sr to be connected to replica servers located at different network nodes)
• The matrices 
1,
2 of arc costs ξ1h and ξ2h (for working and backup path computations, accordingly)• The upper bound it_upper on the number of allowed conflicts
OUTPUT The set of k = 2 node-disjoint paths η1, η2
VARIABLES 
tmp auxiliary matrix of arc costs ξ tmph
j index of the path currently to be found
ic conflict counter
Step 1 Set ic = 1.
Step 2 Set j = 1.
Step 3 For each network arc ah, set ξ tmph = ξjh .
Step 4 For each path ηi from the set of previously found j − 1 paths and for each arc ah, if ah is a forbidden arc∗ of the path ηi , then increase
the arc cost ξ tmph by the total cost ξ i of ηi in 
j .
Step 5 Find ηj using the Dijkstra’s algorithm and the costs matrix 
tmp .
Step 6 If ηj is not disjoint with the previously found j − 1 paths then:
6.1 Increase the costs ξ ih of each conflicting arc∗∗ ah of ηj by the total cost ξj of ηj in all matrices 
i , accordingly. After that, delete
the found paths.
6.2 Set ic = ic + 1.
6.3 if ic > it_upper then
terminate and reject the demand,
else go to Step 2.
else set j = j + 1.
Step 7 If j > 2 then terminate and return the found set of paths
else go to Step 3.
* A forbidden arc of ηi is an arc that is traversed by ηi , or is incident to any transit node of ηi (for link and nodal disjointedness, respectively)
** An arc ah is a conflicting arc of a given path ηj , if:
– is jointly used by ηj and by any other of previous j − 1 paths (when link disjointedness is required), or
– is incident to any common transit node jointly used by ηj and by any other of previous j − 1 paths (in the case of nodal disjointedness)
Fig. 6 The proposed algorithm to find k = 2 node-disjoint paths of a demand (unicast or anycast)
where |N | is the number of nodes. Our algorithm can be
easily modified to return a set of k-disjoint paths for each
demand, where k is any arbitrary positive value.
Example execution of the algorithm will be presented
here for the case of Italian Network from Fig. 5. Initial costs
of working and backup path links are as given in Figs. 7, 8.
They are based on (3) and (5), accordingly.
Figures 9, 10, 11, 12 present the example execution of
our algorithm used here to find the working and backup
paths for a unicast connection between nodes 4 and 21. Af-
ter finding the working path η1: 4-11-12-14-21 (Fig. 9) the
costs of the respective forbidden links to be used in backup
path calculations are increased by the total cost of η1 us-
ing the costs from 
2 depicted in Fig. 8 (i.e. by 1.89). After
that, the backup path η2: 4-5-11-17-21 is found (Fig. 10).
However, it has a common transit node 11 with the working
path. Therefore, the costs ξ1h and ξ
2
h of all conflicting arcs
ah (i.e. arcs incident to node 11) are permanently increased
by the total cost of the path η2 calculated using the initial
matrices 
1 and 
2 of working and backup path link costs
(i.e. by 3.03 and 1.58 in 
1,
2 accordingly), and computa-
tions start from the beginning. After that, the algorithm man-
ages to find the connection paths, which are finally shown in
Fig. 12. Working path η∗1: 4-5-12-14-21 omits nodes of high-
degree (and is therefore resistant-to-attacks). Backup path
η∗2: 4-11-17-20-21 is found as the shortest one. It traverses
central nodes 11 and 17, but is used only after a failure for a
short time.
5 Simulation results
Simulations were performed to evaluate the characteristics
of the proposed approach regarding the aggregate number
of connections broken due to attacks (i.e. the total number
of broken connections in a single simulation), link capac-
ity utilization ratio, the length working and backup paths, as
well as the time of connection restoration. Time of connec-
tion restoration was calculated according to [18]. Numerical
experiments were performed using CPLEX 11.0 and the re-
spective heuristic algorithm for the topologies of two irreg-
ular networks shown in Fig. 13, i.e. the ASF Network and
BA-150 Network, consisting of 15 and 150 nodes, accord-
ingly. These topologies were obtained using the Barabási-
Albert algorithm of topology generation from [5].
For each anycast and unicast demand dr , we assumed the
following properties:
– the demanded capacity equal to the link channel capacity
(i.e. unitary),
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Fig. 7 Initial costs of links used in working path computations calcu-
lated for the example Italian network
Fig. 8 Initial costs of links used in backup path computations calcu-
lated for the example Italian network
Fig. 9 Round 1 of the example execution of the proposed algorithm
Fig. 10 Round 2 of the example execution of the proposed heuristic
algorithm
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Fig. 11 Round 3 of the example execution of the proposed heuristic
algorithm
– providing 100% of the requested capacity after a failure,
– protection against a failure of a single node,
– providing a single backup path to protect each working
path (i.e. path protection scheme).
When routing the demands, a given incoming channel
could be converted to any outgoing channel at a given transit
node.
In our RA approach, working paths of anycast and uni-
cast demands were calculated using the metric from (3) (that
made them omit high-degree nodes, i.e. nodes being vulner-
able to attacks). However, backup paths were found as the
shortest ones using the standard metric of distance. Replica
servers were located at nodes of the lowest degree (i.e. with
the lowest possibility of being affected due to attacks). The
properties of the RA approach were compared with the ones
for the common NA technique of utilizing the standard dis-
tance metric in both working and backup path computations
((5) in both cases), and locating the anycast replica servers
at high-degree nodes.
In both cases, we used the disjoint replica model imply-
ing that working and backup replica servers were located at
different nodes.
Three scenarios of network load were investigated. In
each case, a single set of anycast demands DAN comprised
all the network nodes. However, the analyzed sets of unicast
demands consisted of the respective numbers of randomly
chosen network node pairs implying three ratios of anycast
Fig. 12 Round 4 of the example execution of the proposed heuristic
algorithm
demands (|DAN |/|D|) equal to 10%, 20%, and 30% accord-
ingly.
We analyzed three scenarios of the number replica
servers (i.e. 2, 3 and 4) located at nodes of highest (NA
model), or lowest (our RA model) degree. Indices of nodes
implying the locations of anycast replica servers in the ana-
lyzed networks are given in Table 1.
A single simulation scenario was determined by the given
network topology, the number of anycast replica servers, and
the total number of demands |D|. For each scenario, com-
putations were performed for 50 different sets of demands.
When simulating attacks, the frequency of node failures was
based on the values of BC∗(n) coefficients.
5.1 Efficiency of the heuristic approach
In this section we evaluate the efficiency of the heuristic al-
gorithm from Fig. 6 by comparing the results with the opti-
mal ones achieved by finding the solution to the ILP prob-
lem defined by formulas (6)–(16). The comparison is pre-
sented in terms of the total link capacity necessary to es-
tablish the requested connections, the average length of the
working and backup paths, as well as regarding the ratio
of connection blocking. The results are given for two ana-
lyzed approaches, namely the introduced RA approach and
the common NA technique. The results are given as a func-
tion of the varying network load (i.e. three ratios of anycast
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Fig. 13 Network topologies
used in simulations: (a) ASF
Network, (b) BA-150 Network
Table 1 Location of Anycast replica servers (node indices)
Network Replica server location 2 replicas 3 replicas 4 replicas
ASF Lowest degrees -RA 1, 3 1, 3, 4 1, 3, 4, 5
Highest degrees -NA 7, 9 7, 9, 15 2, 7, 9, 15
BA-150 Lowest degrees -RA 20, 60 20, 60, 100 20, 60, 100, 137
Highest degrees -NA 3, 5 3, 5, 10 3, 5, 10, 13
demands: |DAN |/|D| equal to 10%, 20%, and 30%, respec-
tively), as well as the number of replica servers (i.e. 2, 3, 4,
accordingly). For this set of experiments we assumed that all
links offered  = 40 channels of equal (unitary) capacity.
Figure 14 shows the ratio of total link capacity utilization
per connection as a function of the network load for the two
analyzed approaches (NA and RA) using the ILP modeling
and the heuristic algorithm. Table 2 presents the respective
lengths of 95% confidence intervals. The results prove that
the amount of capacity needed to establish the connections
using the heuristic algorithm was comparable to the ILP re-
sults. In particular, as shown in Fig. 14, heuristic algorithm
returned the results that were only about 3% worse on aver-
age, compared with the optimal ILP ones. For our RA ap-
proach, heuristic approach sometimes required less capac-
ity (up to 2.49% less). However, such situation might occur,
since the link cost of working paths given by formula (3)
was not consistent with the hop metric.
In general, independent of the chosen way to find paths
(ILP or heuristic), our RA approach required about 10%
more capacity to establish survivable connections, compared
to the common NA method.
Figure 15 shows the average ratio of total link capacity
utilization per connection as a function of varying number
of replica servers for the two analyzed methods (NA and
RA). Table 3 shows the respective values of 95% confidence
intervals. Results show that for each method, the analyzed
average ratio remains practically at the same level, indepen-
dent of the number of replica servers.
Figures 16–19 and Tables 4, 5 present the average lengths
of working and backup paths obtained for the heuristic
algorithm, compared with the optimal ILP ones. The first
two figures (i.e. Figs. 16, 17) refer to the case of vary-
ing network load. Due to the inconsistency of the formula
(3) used to find the working paths in the RA scenario with
the hop metric, as well as owing to the difference between
the objective function of the ILP model and the heuris-
tic algorithm (to minimize the total cost of both connec-
tion paths, or the working path cost only, accordingly), the
heuristic algorithm returned insignificantly shorter work-
ing paths compared to the ILP results (Fig. 16). Indepen-
dent of the network load, for the NA approach the working
paths were always shorter than the respective backup paths
(which is a common case). However, in our RA method,
owing to the requirement to omit high-degree nodes, work-
ing paths turned out to be longer than the associated backup
paths.
Figures 18, 19 show the average lengths of paths as
a function of varying number of replica servers for the
two analyzed methods (NA and RA). Table 5 shows the
respective values of 95% confidence intervals. Similar
to the results of total link capacity utilization ratio per
connection (Fig. 15), the analyzed values remain at the
comparable level, independent of the number of replica
servers.
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Fig. 14 Ratio of total link
capacity utilization per
connection obtained for the ILP
model and using the heuristic
algorithm for different network
loads (number of replica
servers: 2)
Fig. 15 Ratio of total link
capacity utilization per
connection for different
numbers of replica servers
(anycast ratio: 30%)
Table 2 Length of 95% confidence intervals for the average capacity utilization per connection (number of replica servers: 2) [%]
NA, NA, NA, RA, RA, RA,
10% 20% 30% 10% 20% 30%
anycast anycast anycast anycast anycast anycast
ILP 0.000 0.006 0.005 0.000 0.007 0.006
heuristic 0.000 0.005 0.007 0.000 0.005 0.006
Table 3 Length of 95% confidence intervals for the average capacity utilization per connection (anycast ratio: 30%) [%]
NA, NA, NA, RA, RA, RA,
2 replica 3 replica 4 replica 2 replica 3 replica 4 replica
servers servers servers servers servers servers
ILP 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006
heuristic 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
Tables 6 and 7 present the average probability of demand
blocking as a function of the network load, and the number
of replica servers, accordingly. They show that ILP solver
returned paths for all the demands. However, due to limita-
tions on available link capacity, the demand blocking prob-
ability for the heuristic approach sometimes exceeded 0, but
it was never greater than 0.034.
The remaining two parts of this section provide a more
detailed evaluation of the proposed heuristic algorithm. In
particular, apart from investigating the average length of
working and backup paths, we present here also informa-
tion referring to the average value of connection restoration
time, as well as the total number of connections broken af-
ter attacks. Results are given for the two analyzed networks
(ASF and BA-150), with the number of channels per link set
to  = 160.
5.2 Detailed results for the heuristic algorithm (varying
network load)
The number of available anycast replica servers is assumed
here to be equal to 3. Figure 20 presents the average lengths
of working and backup paths as a function of the network
load obtained for the heuristic algorithm for the two inves-
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Fig. 16 Average length of
working paths obtained for the
heuristic algorithm and the ILP
model for different network
loads (number of replica
servers: 2)
Fig. 17 Average length of
backup paths obtained for the
heuristic algorithm and the ILP
model for different network
loads (number of replica
servers: 2)
Fig. 18 Average length of
working paths for different
numbers of replica servers
(anycast ratio: 30%)
Fig. 19 Average length of
backup paths for different
numbers of replica servers
(anycast ratio: 30%)
Table 4 Length of 95% confidence intervals for the average length of connection paths (number of replica servers: 2) [km]
NA, NA, NA, RA, RA, RA,
10% 20% 30% 10% 20% 30%
anycast anycast anycast anycast anycast anycast
ILP, working paths 0.000 29.534 25.878 0.000 98.624 120.020
Heuristic, working paths 0.000 43.220 52.345 0.000 82.235 103.036
ILP, backup paths 0.000 29.534 25.877 0.000 43.382 56.783
Heuristic, backup paths 0.000 64.475 89.016 0.000 40.627 46.036
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Table 5 Length of 95% confidence intervals for the average length of connection paths (anycast ratio: 30%) [km]
NA, NA, NA, RA, RA, RA,
2 replica 3 replica 4 replica 2 replica 3 replica 4 replica
servers servers servers servers servers servers
ILP, working paths 26.114 31.465 28.958 120.888 126.096 129.329
Heuristic, working paths 52.345 53.687 53.688 103.036 105.612 108.320
ILP, backup paths 26.113 31.464 28.958 54.174 55.565 56.990
Heuristic, backup paths 89.016 90.298 91.298 46.036 47.186 48.396
Table 6 Demand blocking probability for varying network load (number of replica servers: 2)
NA, 10% NA, 20% NA, 30% RA, 10% RA, 20% RA, 30%
anycast anycast anycast anycast anycast anycast
ILP 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Heuristic 0.017 0.016 0.024 0.034 0.000 0.000
Table 7 Demand blocking probability for varying number of replica servers (anycast ratio: 30%)
NA, NA, NA, RA, RA, RA,
2 replica 3 replica 4 replica 2 replica 3 replica 4 replica
servers servers servers servers servers servers
ILP 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Heuristic 0.024 0.025 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
tigated approaches, i.e. NA and RA. Table 8 presents the
respective lengths of 95% confidence intervals.
Results show that the obtained working paths for the pro-
posed RA approach, are even up to 2.26 times longer, com-
pared to the case of the common NA approach to find the
shortest working paths using the formula (5). This was a
direct implication of the fact that RA working paths tried
to omit nodes of high-degree. However, for higher ratios
of anycast demands (|DAN |/|D|), this difference became
smaller. In particular, it was greater for the BA-150 net-
work. The reason for this is that BA-150 is a network ob-
tained using more iterations of the Barabási-Albert algo-
rithm of a scale-free network topology generation. There-
fore this topology is “more scale-free” than the one of the
15-node ASF network.
Backup paths obtained using the proposed RA approach
were up to 25% shorter, compared to the results for the com-
mon NA technique. This was a direct implication of the fact
that only in the NA model, working paths were found as the
shortest ones using the standard metrics of distance, which
resulted in longer disjoint backup paths. Additionally, ow-
ing to the fact that NA working paths were established as
the shortest ones and did not omit nodes of high degree, they
were also shorter than the respective backup paths.
Figure 21 presents the total number of broken connec-
tions measured in the whole simulation as a function of
the network load for the analyzed NA and RA approaches.
Working paths in the RA model omitted high-degree nodes.
As a result, up to 7.47 times less connections were broken
after attacks for the RA approach, compared to the case of
the NA technique. The difference was more visible for the
larger network (BA-150).
Figure 22 shows the results referring to the average value
of connection restoration time. Table 9 gives the respective
lengths of 95% confidence intervals. In general the value
of connection restoration time is mainly determined by the
length of the backup path. Therefore, in our experiments the
results for the proposed RA approach turned out to be about
17% better (i.e., smaller), compared to the respective ones
for the common NA technique.
Table 10 presents the values of the demand blocking
probability for the NA and RA approaches as a function
of the network load. The number of available channels at
each link (i.e. 160) was sufficient to establish all the connec-
tions. Therefore, the obtained values were equal to 0 in each
case.
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Fig. 20 Average length of
working and backup paths
Fig. 21 Aggregate number of
broken connections
Fig. 22 Values of connection
restoration time
Table 8 Length of 95% confidence intervals for the average length of connection paths [km]
ASF, ASF, ASF, BA-150, BA-150, BA-150,
10% 20% 30% 10% 20% 30%
anycast anycast anycast anycast anycast anycast
NA, working path 0.000 43.220 52.345 21.713 23.330 25.436
NA, backup path 0.000 64.475 89.016 20.932 23.514 23.282
RA, working path 0.000 86.489 111.171 69.851 97.386 84.138
RA, backup path 0.000 42.728 49.670 19.013 20.301 22.768
Table 9 Length of 95% confidence intervals for the average value of connection restoration time [ms]
ASF, ASF, ASF, BA-150, BA-150, BA-150,
10% 20% 30% 10% 20% 30%
anycast anycast anycast anycast anycast anycast
NA 0.521 1.115 1.525 0.518 0.366 0.291
RA 0.339 0.753 0.855 0.733 0.720 0.540
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Fig. 23 Average length of
working and backup paths
Fig. 24 Aggregate number of
broken connections
Table 10 Demand blocking probability
ASF, ASF, ASF, BA-150, BA-150, BA-150,
10% 20% 30% 10% 20% 30%
anycast anycast anycast anycast anycast anycast
NA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
RA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 11 Length of 95% confidence intervals for the average length of working and backup paths [km]
ASF, ASF, ASF, BA-150, BA-150, BA-150,
2 replica 3 replica 4 replica 2 replica 3 replica 4 replica
servers servers servers servers servers servers
NA, working path 42.512 43.220 44.710 23.330 23.330 23.330
NA, backup path 63.418 64.475 66.699 23.514 23.514 23.514
RA, working path 83.606 86.489 88.006 97.386 97.386 98.221
RA, backup path 41.304 42.728 43.478 20.301 20.301 20.541
5.3 Detailed results for the heuristic algorithm (varying
number of replica servers)
The last set of experiments was to analyze the properties
of the proposed heuristics for the case of varying num-
ber of anycast replica servers (i.e. 2, 3, and 4). The re-
sults are provided here for the case of the anycast de-
mand ratio (|DAN |/|D|) equal to 20%. Results presented
in Figs. 23, 24, 25 and Tables 11, 12, 13 prove that the
differences between all the analyzed characteristics re-
garding varying numbers of replica servers are negligi-
ble.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we discussed an important issue of protecting
the communication networks against attacks. In particular,
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Fig. 25 Values of connection
restoration time
Table 12 95% confidence intervals for the average value of connection restoration time [ms]
ASF, ASF, ASF, BA-150, BA-150, BA-150,
2 replica 3 replica 4 replica 2 replica 3 replica 4 replica
servers servers servers servers servers servers
NA 0.111 0.112 0.115 0.035 0.037 0.041
RA 0.067 0.075 0.072 0.058 0.072 0.083
Table 13 Demand blocking probability
ASF, ASF, ASF, BA-150, BA-150, BA-150,
2 replica 3 replica 4 replica 2 replica 3 replica 4 replica
servers servers servers servers servers servers
NA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
RA 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
we focused on joint protection of anycast and unicast flows.
The main achievement of the paper was a new approach
(which we called RA) to provide protection of anycast and
unicast flows against attacks, dedicated to networks of irreg-
ular topology.
The main features included the introduction of a special
metric to be used in working path computations to make
these paths omit high-degree nodes, and locating the any-
cast replica servers at low-degree nodes.
The respective ILP model was proposed and followed
by a time-efficient heuristic algorithm. The efficiency of the
heuristic algorithm was shown based on the results of simu-
lation experiments. The most significant achievement of our
RA approach was the remarkable decrease (up to 7.47 times)
of the number of connections broken after attacks, compared
to the results for the common NA case of using the stan-
dard distance metric to find both the working and backup
paths, as well as locating the replica servers at high-degree
nodes.
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